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Marco Amati and Makoto Yokohari
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The Establishment of the London Greenbelt: Reaching Consensus over Purchasing Land

Marco Amati
*Massey University, New Zealand*

Makoto Yokohari
*University of Tokyo*

The successful establishment of the greenbelt around London during the 1930s acted as an inspiration for postwar planners in the United Kingdom and in other countries. The history of ideas that supported this establishment has been investigated, but no research has examined the implementation of the 1930s' greenbelt. The objective of this article is to investigate why the greenbelt was successfully established in the 1930s, despite the United Kingdom's weak planning system and the unprecedented urban growth at the time. In particular, the authors highlight the role of landowners and county council members in establishing the greenbelt. Finally, they discuss how the history of the greenbelt has to be reassessed.

**Keywords:** greenbelts; London; interwar; consensus building

The historiography of British planning can be broadly divided, as Sutcliffe notes, into two traditions that either trace the history of planning ideas or the history of planning as public administration.¹ The former history has emphasized grand designs and the individuals that supported them. It has highlighted the links between these individuals’ ideas and the development of planning movements, such as garden cities, during the twentieth century. The latter history has emphasized the impact of planning policies on individuals, seeing the development of planning in terms of a cumulative public intervention in the urban and, more recently, the rural environment.

The history that has been written of the greenbelt is exclusively a history of individuals and their ideas. Indeed, this history reads, as Gault notes, like a who’s who of U.K. planning with famous planners each making significant contributions to its establishment.² A number of well-known studies describe the contributions that these famous planners made at different


times. Thomas and especially Miller highlight the role of Raymond Unwin in promulgating a “green girdle” during the interwar period.³ Munton and more recently Elson both describe the evolution of the greenbelt concept; from Ebenezer Howard’s “Garden Cities” (1898), through to Patrick Abercrombie’s *cordon-sanitair* (1944), and into the postwar period.⁴ Cherry and Rogers provide details on the postwar greenbelt and the role of the minister of Housing and Local Government, Duncan Sandys, in enabling it to be successfully implemented from 1955 onward.⁵ The London greenbelt has endured changes in government and periods of high development pressure from the 1930s to the present; it currently covers an area of 5,085 km² in which all development except that relating to agriculture is effectively prohibited. Despite bringing benefits such as access to green spaces, the greenbelt’s fifty-year prohibition on all development has recently made it a target for critics who judge it to be unfair, outdated and inefficient.⁶

Planning historians have tended to an uncritical examination of the historical development of the greenbelt. Like garden cities, the greenbelt is a demonstration of the effect of concepts that were developed by planning “heroes” such as Ebenezer Howard, Patrick Abercrombie, and Raymond Unwin. As such, it has played a significant part in the construction of planning as a discipline because it is a satisfyingly concrete example of the power of planning ideas. Planning historians who uncritically show the power of these ideas through the greenbelt might be considered similar to Foucault’s historians of medicine: they are engaged in a project of creating myths of the past that justify the present.⁷ One way that planning historians have created these myths is to imply that the present-day greenbelt is the inevitable outcome of a rationally determined process. Thus, the history of the greenbelt has been written as a cumulative series of interventions with each planning hero playing his part to rationally produce a greenbelt that met the perceived needs of the public. This history has ignored the problematic way in which the aim of the greenbelt was articulated in practice during its establishment in the 1930s. Furthermore, it has made invisible the involvement of landowners, central government civil servants, and county council members in allowing the greenbelt to become one of the most famous methods of urban growth control among planners.

Initial evidence suggests that landowners had a significant role to play in establishing the greenbelt. W. R. Davidge’s 1927 Hertfordshire Regional Planning Report contains a mention of the greenbelt running through Hertfordshire. He tantalizingly mentions the important role that landowners were already playing, noting how they were able to contribute by “offering to enter into an agreement which will secure, without compensation or cost to the public, the permanent preservation of many invaluable private open spaces.”⁸

Following the Second World War purchasing land became obsolete as a method to control urban growth in the United Kingdom but remains
popular in the United States. As Daniels notes, since 1998 state and local governments in the United States have spent nearly $900 million to preserve more than 500,000 acres [202,343 ha] of farmland through purchase of development rights programs.\(^9\) More recently, Miller and Krieger have shown that such programs remain popular at the state level, and they describe a number of strategies that are used.\(^10\)

Currently only one published work exists that describes the strategies that were used to buy and preserve land for the London greenbelt in the 1930s.\(^11\) The significance of the greenbelt as a cornerstone of planning means that a critical analysis of its establishment is essential. In this study we aim to problematize the processes that were involved in the establishment of the greenbelt so as to refute the idea that it was an inevitable or rationally determined outcome of a central planning philosophy. By providing detail on the establishment of the greenbelt, we aid understanding of why the greenbelt halted the tide of urban growth in London but was seen to have failed in some countries. We aim to show that the success perceived of the greenbelt was contingent on a number of factors in addition to the involvement of planning heroes. Finally, we aim to contribute to planning in the United States by elucidating a number of strategies that were used in purchasing development rights to establish the greenbelt.

In the following we first briefly describe how the implementation of the greenbelt became important for planning as a discipline. We then examine the emergence of the greenbelt concept and the institutional context of its establishment. We focus on the establishment of the greenbelt in practice by examining how land was purchased from private landowners and the Crown. Finally, we discuss the motivations of landowners for allowing the establishment of the greenbelt. The following research employs data from the National Archives Public Records Office, the Surrey History Centre, the London Metropolitan Archives, the Council for the Preservation of Rural England Archives, and the Essex Records Office.

The Evolution of the Greenbelt and Its Importance for Planning as a Discipline

The greenbelt is a cornerstone of planning because for more than a century planners have striven to control urban growth and strictly separate urban from rural areas. As Freestone has noted in his review of the concept, the prewar period saw the adoption of greenbelts in different forms around the world.\(^12\) The desirability of having a belt of green space surrounding a city was echoed in the Depression-era greenbelt towns of the United States and the 1860 parkland towns of Australia, to name but two examples. The greenbelt was reiterated as a principle of town planning in international conferences. The 1924 International City Planning Conference in Amsterdam, for
example, included a greenbelt as one of seven principles of city planning and was highly influential on modern Japanese town planning.  

To think of greenbelts between the 1890s and the 1930s is to think almost inescapably of two giants of U.K. town planning: Ebenezer Howard and Raymond Unwin. Ebenezer Howard, the founder of modern town planning, conceived of the greenbelt as an integral element in the “garden city.” He took his inspiration from the colonial attempts to plan “town–belts” in South Australia and New Zealand. Unwin, on the other hand, argued that planners should separate urban from rural areas, borrowing the idea from European medieval towns that had imposed this separation through military necessity.

Other notable figures in the United Kingdom proposed greenbelt plans during the early twentieth century. Lord Meath, the first chairman of the London County Council’s (LCC) Parks and Open Spaces Committee, and William Bull proposed “green girdles” around London in 1901. Furthermore, the influential London Society proposed a greenbelt for agriculture, which could be paid for through agricultural rents in 1921.

As Miller describes, Raymond Unwin was a seminal and influential figure throughout the attempts to implement a greenbelt between 1910 and 1935. In 1929, he became the chief planner of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee and published his first report. In the committee’s First Report, Unwin proposed a “green girdle” for the enjoyment of Londoners to compensate for the deficiency of open spaces. Unwin had been strongly influenced by a 1929 LCC investigation that had shown the need for playing fields around London. However, the implementation of Unwin’s plan was prevented by a government financial crisis in 1931. Miller notes Unwin’s “public spiritedness” in paying for the publication of the 1933 Second Report in the face of a large cut in the committee’s budget. Before being disbanded, the Greater London Regional Planning Committee unsuccessfully made an attempt to convince the Treasury and the Air and Army Ministries to pay for the greenbelt in 1934. A lack of money to pay for land purchases was the main reason why none of the plans described above achieved their aim of surrounding London with a belt of open space.

It was not until 1935 that the problem of paying for land in the greenbelt was solved. In January of that year, the LCC announced its greenbelt loans’ scheme to lend money to the counties that surround London to purchase land for the greenbelt. The ministry responsible for Town Planning at the time, the Ministry of Health, had weak powers, and urban areas were growing at an unprecedented high rate. Despite a high demand for land and a legal framework that allowed landowners to make large profits from development, in the space of three and a half years the county councils had reached agreements with landowners to purchase 68,000 acres [11,400 ha] of land for preservation.
All of this land was then permanently preserved under the Green Belt (London and Home Counties) Act 1938, which prohibited local authorities from selling the land without permission from the Minister of Health. The act similarly prohibited the erection of buildings on the land other than those that were “ancillary to the purposes for which . . . that land is for the time being used.”

Between 1945 and 1955 U.K. planning legislation underwent momentous changes opening up the possibility for implementing a greenbelt around London and other U.K. cities without purchasing land. There is not the space to discuss these changes in full but of notable significance was the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act, which nationalized development rights. In addition, the publication of Patrick Abercrombie’s *County of London Plan 1943* and his *Greater London Plan 1944* contained sections on the greenbelt and directly influenced central government thinking. In August 1955, Duncan Sandys, the minister with responsibility for planning, issued a circular calling on all local planning authorities, county councils in England and Wales, to consider submitting plans for a greenbelt “wherever this is desirable.”

The greenbelt became a policy of central government prompting widespread acclaim. In his 1955 presidential address to the Town Planning Institute, Desmond Heap stated that “the preservation of green belts is . . . the very *raison d’être* of town and country planning.” The Town and Country Planning Association were able to pronounce that “one great nation has officially adopted one of the major principles of the garden city idea formulated by Sir Ebenezer Howard in 1898.”

In the postwar period the greenbelt was borrowed from the United Kingdom’s example in “undiluted” form by many countries. Internationally, the greenbelt was a mixed success. In Tokyo, for example, a greenbelt was established after the Second World War but was actively resisted by landowners throughout the 1950s and was finally abandoned in early 1969. The greenbelt in Sydney suffered a similar fate because planners severely underestimated the rate of postwar population growth (Freestone 1992). In Korea, the greenbelt was enforced by the dictator Park Chung-Hee in 1971. The advent of democracy in 1986 allowed landowners to voice their opposition to the policy, and the pressure for development from the 1988 Seoul Olympics has since prompted a greenbelt reform. In New Zealand the greenbelt was adopted in Wellington and Christchurch during the 1950s. It was quickly abandoned in Wellington where the steep hills meant that urban growth was considerably restricted anyway. In Christchurch the greenbelt remained until the 1990s when it was abandoned because of the major changes to the planning system ushered in by the Resource Management Act (1991).

Although there is ample evidence to suggest that the greenbelt was adopted by planners that were emulating the United Kingdom’s example,
there are other reasons why the greenbelt had appeal during the postwar period. The greenbelt’s strict separation of land into rural and urban zones would have resonated well with modernist planning techniques. Although the greenbelts in many cases failed to prevent urban growth, their appeal lay in the evident impact they had on land use and their ability to unite disparate local concerns in a regional objective. Finally, the greenbelt offered a solution to the perceived chaos of postwar rapid industrialization and the urban growth that faced cities such as Tokyo, Seoul, and Sydney.

Implementing the London Greenbelt

We now turn our discussion to prewar London, where chaotic urban expansion in the 1920s provided a primary reason for establishing the greenbelt. Between 1918 and 1939 the city’s area doubled, but its population increased by less than one-fifth. This great expansion had occurred for a variety of reasons. Because of a decline in agriculture from 1880, rising tax and death duties, and the death of heirs after the First World War, large farming estates were sold and broken up during the 1920s and 1930s. This increased the fragmentation of land ownership. In 1914 owners occupied 10 percent of agricultural land in England and Wales. In 1927 this figure had risen to 37 percent. A rising standard of living, a shorter working week, and improved transport resulted in new pressures on the countryside during the 1920s and 1930s. For example, the area under urban land use in England and Wales increased from 6.7 percent to 8.0 percent between 1931 and 1939, a rate not seen before then or since.34 Pressure also came from the middle and working classes to access the countryside for holidays, rambling, and other leisure pursuits.35 To summarize, as a 1926 report for the mid-Surrey Joint Town Planning Committee explains, this was a time when the “natural restraints imposed by distance and the difficulty of obtaining land were now largely swept away.”36

Development of Institutions

Although urban growth meant that the implementation of the London greenbelt eluded planners until 1935, the early twentieth century saw the development of institutions that were to subsequently play an important role. First, the LCC had been created in 1889 with an administrative area covering most of the built-up area. Starting with a staff of 3,369 employees, the number working for the council rose rapidly as it took over responsibilities for tramways and the London Schools’ Board. By 1905 the total staff numbered 35,316 making the LCC one of the largest employers in London. In 1933 the number of people working for the LCC peaked at 85,676.37
Second, outlying municipalities around London had been active in buying land for preservation. The Ministry of Health between 1930 and 1934 had been giving loans to allow councils to buy 1,465 ha of land. Third, regional planning was promulgated by Joint Town Planning Committees (JTPCs). These were described as having a “purely advisory” function, taking a broader view of town planning. They allowed the different municipalities to reach agreements and to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues. By joining a JTPC, a local district council could participate in determining the aim of the greenbelt and other regional open-space schemes. The largest and most influential of the JTPCs at the time was the Greater London Regional Planning Committee.

The 1935 LCC Greenbelt Scheme

On January 29, 1935 the implementation of the greenbelt was finally enabled by the LCC greenbelt loans scheme. The conditions for lending money to county councils surrounding London within the scheme were as follows:

- Loans were available for up to 50 percent of the cost of purchase or legally “sterilizing” the land.
- In total, £2 million was available over three years.

The scheme was devised by Herbert Morrison who became the Labour leader of the LCC after a landslide election victory in 1934. Morrison was firmly committed to the idea of dispersal of London and the restriction on the size of London’s growth. He had lodged in Letchworth as a conscientious objector between 1917 and 1918. There he had met his wife and also encountered F. J. Osborn, who was subsequently to become one of the most tenacious British propagandists for dispersal through his work on New Towns. Morrison brought his enthusiasm for dispersal to bear on the London Labour Party, which in 1920 adopted dispersal as a policy. The LCC’s loans’ scheme was an eventual result of Morrison’s enthusiasm.

In the following we show that the implementation of the greenbelt was problematic in two ways. First, councils bought land for a variety of reasons that sometimes undermined the idea that the greenbelt was being implemented in the public interest. Second, councils developed a number of strategies to purchase as large an area of greenbelt as possible.

The Reasons for Buying Land in the Greenbelt Scheme

Previous authors have argued that the early-twentieth-century greenbelt proposals aimed to fulfill a demand from the public for leisure, amenity, or agricultural production. Although such public-interest demands may have existed, the process of articulating them and linking them to the expenditure
of funds for land preservation was problematic. Indeed, this problematic process was inherent to the document that announces the establishment of the LCC loans scheme since it does not include a definition of the greenbelt’s purpose. From the beginning of the scheme, the objective was clearly to purchase as much land as possible to offset future costs that would be incurred as the growth of London reached outlying areas. It was largely left to the individual municipalities to determine the aim of the greenbelt more precisely. For example, when Surrey County Council pressed the LCC for an explanation of the aim of the greenbelt, London replied in the broadest terms: if playing fields were bought, they must not be reserved for the use of local players only, otherwise the land should be designated for people to “roam about in.”

Although flexibility in determining the aim of the greenbelt ensured that a great deal of land was bought, it meant that by the time the scheme came to an end in 1938 the use for this land defied explanation, as the LCC Parks Committee debates show. The committee considered whether signs should be used to mark the location of the greenbelt so that it could be better used by the public (Figure 1). Eventually, however, they decided against them because on agricultural lands in particular the words “‘Green Belt’ appear to convey to many people the mistaken idea that the whole property is open to the public.”

Under the 1935 scheme three levels of authority controlled the greenbelt purchases. The local rural district council or urban district council would first select and propose sites. The planners in the county council would vet or support sites according to whether they thought the LCC would approve the site. The LCC would finally choose from the proposed sites which one would receive a loan for the purchase and inclusion in the greenbelt. A period of negotiation would then ensue to decide the proportion of money to come from the local council, county council, and LCC. The LCC never lent more than 50 percent of the land’s purchase cost and often lent much less, however, it had considerable influence over the decision to purchase land.

Although the use of land in the greenbelt was never clearly stated by the LCC, the rationale that the councils used to justify purchasing land implies certain uses. Sites that were not used or valued by the public, or not likely to be urbanized, could not be included in the scheme. This explains why Richmond Deer Park and the Royal Botanic Gardens at Kew were not purchased for the greenbelt in Surrey despite being promoted as suitable sites by Richmond Borough. These sites were sufficiently well-known areas to be protected from development without having to be included in the greenbelt. The plight of East End children was sometimes acceptable as a justification for purchasing land. For example, the Borough Engineer for Banstead Urban District Council convinced Surrey County Council to purchase land for preservation by referring to how the land was used for recreational outings.
Figure 1: Sign for the Greenbelt, 1938

Source: LMA LCC/CL/PK/1/26.

Note: In the end, the London County Council never used these signs. It was feared that the signs might encourage people to overrun the greenbelt. LMA = London Metropolitan Archives; LCC = London County Council.
for slum children from the East End of London. Ease of access and proximity to the center of London were other criteria used to justify the purchase of land in the greenbelt. Access could either be by public transport, or the land could be connected with footpaths to other areas. The Greater London Regional Planning Committee encouraged the LCC to prioritize the purchase of land within the originally designated greenbelt area. Although this linking up land was occasionally considered as a criterion for purchase, access for Londoners remained one of the most important criteria for including land in the greenbelt.

Inevitably tensions arose between the LCC and other councils whose proposed purchases stretched the definition of public open space. In 1937 Surrey County Council began negotiations for the purchase of the Royal Wimbledon Golf Club and an adjoining forty acres. Surrey County Council tried to argue that the land would serve as “linking-up” land (i.e., land that would serve to link one patch of greenbelt with another). The LCC did not consider the land suitable for the greenbelt, because it clearly was not public open space and was, and remains, one of its most exclusive golf clubs. Nonetheless, Wimbledon Borough Council, with Surrey County Council’s encouragement, proceeded with the land purchase, and a course of action was decided upon at a special meeting. In the end the land was bought with a loan from the Ministry of Health and a 20 percent contribution from Surrey County Council.

The Cost of Land as a Restriction on Land Purchases

A far more problematic and potentially restrictive aspect of the implementation of the greenbelt was the cost of land purchases. This forced councils to develop a number of strategies to purchase as much land as possible. Land for the greenbelt came from two sources, either from private landowners or from Crown land whose sales were restricted to the highest bidder.

Both types of land purchases were potentially expensive for district councils. In general, private landowners were motivated by profit and would either oppose development restrictions or expect compensation. When land was sold by the Crown, laws existed to ensure that it went to the highest bidder. The 1925 Settled Land Act and the Crown Lands Act (1927) both legislated that the Chief Commissioner of Crown Lands had to sell land to the highest bidder and that the ultimate proceeds would go to the Exchequer. The highest bidder was unlikely to be a district council and more likely to be a developer. Crown land differed from public land because it was considered a national asset. Any revenue generated from this land (e.g., from selling or farming) went to the Treasury to benefit the nation as a whole. The land was owned by a branch of the government’s Crown Agents and managed by C. L. Stocks, the Chief Commissioner of the Crown...
Lands. Stocks was a member of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England, an amenity group set up in 1926 to protect the countryside from sprawl. Stocks himself was enthusiastic about preserving the countryside and “delighted at the thought of saving some of this land from jerry-builders.” If the Crown agents were to sell land to a local authority at a discount, no matter how worthy the cause, this would have represented a national subsidy to a local authority and would have set a precedent for other localities. In addition, giving land to local authorities would “put large sums of money into the pockets of adjoining landowners . . . some of whom would be members of the local authority responsible for putting the suggestion to [the Crown Agents].” Stock’s legal and moral responsibility was thus to deal with the local authorities as with any purchaser of land.

Overcoming the Restrictions

The problem that the cost of private land posed for councils was overcome by the ingenious use of a variety of strategies to co-opt landowners into selling at below the market price. We describe these strategies by examining the purchases that the counties of Surrey, Essex, and Middlesex made between 1935 and 1938 in the face of intense development pressures.

The problem that the cost of Crown land posed for councils was overcome by Stocks’ enthusiasm for planning and land preservation. We describe the way in which Stocks sold two sites in the county of Essex at favorable prices so that it could be included in the greenbelt. Although the proportion bought from the Crown was small compared to all that was bought from private landowners, the case of the Crown lands demonstrates how some individuals in government departments that did not have official responsibility for town planning were able to facilitate the greenbelt’s establishment. Although the law should have restricted Stocks to sell to the highest bidder, he was able to delay and bend the rules that restricted his actions to eventually sell land to Essex County Council and have it preserved as greenbelt.

Negotiation and Secrecy: A Focus on Private Land Purchases in Middlesex, Surrey, and Essex

In 1930, Surrey was the richest county in the United Kingdom and was in the process of undergoing profound changes. For example, the population rose from 845,578 people in 1911 to 1,180,878 in 1931 (40 percent) as a result of the construction of a new railway line and a growth in the number of commuters. Surrey was also a convenient destination for London-based holidaymakers and day-trippers. Essex and Middlesex were also undergoing similar but less dramatic changes. Despite these pressures, all three
counties successfully implemented the greenbelt policy by purchasing 42,200 acres of land. This represented 62 percent of the surface area of land in the greenbelt bought by July 1938.

In 1931 Parliament passed the Surrey Local Act in response to its urban growth pressures. Sections 70 and 71 allowed the council to purchase land for preservation from private landowners. Surrey was the only council to pass this special act; nonetheless, by 1935 development controls existed that were to become useful in establishing the greenbelt for all counties around London including Essex and Middlesex.59 The two most significant of these were the General Interim Development Order of 1933, which allowed councils to require a particular schedule of development, and the 1932 Town and Country Planning Act, which first defined development and gave local authorities some control over land use. Essex, Middlesex, and Surrey had Town Planning Committees that reviewed and recommended sites for purchase in the greenbelt. Surrey in particular formed a Town Planning (Green Belt) Special Sub-Committee. The committee was chaired by Captain E. H. Tuckwell; its members were Sir Phillip Henriques and James Chuter-Ede, vice-chairman and chairman of Surrey County Council, respectively.60

The committees developed a number of strategies to purchase land under the greenbelt scheme that went far beyond what was available to them in the statutes. Although some strategies were employed in exceptional cases, it is important to understand and report them because they show the ingenuity that members of the councils in all three counties used to implement the greenbelt. The following list of techniques used in negotiating purchases refers broadly to local authorities, which comprised both county councils and urban or rural district councils.

**Sterilization.** Cases in Essex and Surrey show that the local authorities were able to purchase land in the greenbelt but then secure a guarantee that further land was not to be developed. This process of sterilization of land occurred with the case of Lambourne Hall in Essex, where 337 acres [136 ha] of land were purchased with a further 33 acres [13 ha] being sterilized.61 Sterilization meant that land could be added to the greenbelt at a fraction of the cost of a full purchase. For example, out of a total of forty-nine cases of land bought for the greenbelt in Essex, the average cost per acre for purchased land was £105/acre, whereas the average cost for land that included sterilized land was £54/acre.

**Attaching covenants or agreements.** Instead of a straightforward purchase, the local authority could enter into a covenant with the landowner.62 Various conditions could be attached to this covenant. For example, Surrey County Council allowed the landowner to live in a house on the land until death, at which point the land would be transferred to the
local authority and become part of the greenbelt. A similar case occurred in Middlesex with the purchase of 572 acres [231 ha] of Breakspeare Estate, where the council was able to pay one-third of the total cost of £30,800 with the balance to be paid after the death of the owner.

If the local authority failed to reach a satisfactory agreement for the whole of the land, they could negotiate with the landowner for them to develop part of the land and to preserve the rest as greenbelt. This method is demonstrated by the case of Warley Place in Brentwood, Essex. The site consisted of a large mansion standing in 45.5 acres [18.4 ha] of parkland and was earmarked for inclusion in the greenbelt by Essex County Council. The LCC, however, did not sanction the purchase of land until late 1936, because it was deemed to be too far from London’s main center. By that stage, the land had already been sold to a landowner who wanted to develop the land. The district council attempted to stop development by disapproving the developer’s plans. The landowner appealed to the Ministry of Health, and eventually the councils came to an agreement that allowed them to exercise control over the development: a limit of thirty-two was set on the number of houses that could be developed, and 7 acres [2.8 ha] were to be reserved as private open space. Furthermore, the council was able to purchase 12.5 acres [5 ha] of land for inclusion in the greenbelt. As the dark gray area in Figure 2 shows, this was a substantial proportion of the total.

In some cases, the county council failed to purchase any of the land but could reach an agreement with the landowner to restrict its activities and maintain the land in an open condition. This occurred in the case of Cloverhambury Farm in Essex, which had been bought by Clapton Stadium Ltd. The council was able to demand at no cost that Clapton Stadium Ltd. erect buildings for a maximum of 250 dogs and no more than 30 employees.

Buying manorial and lammas rights attached to the land. Manorial rights are of ancient origin and date from before the Norman Conquest. These rights enabled a lord to use the land in a variety of ways without owning it. After 1925 it no longer became possible to create these rights, which were typically associated with hunting, grazing, shooting, the right to hold fairs, and the right to extract minerals. Nonetheless, manorial rights could still be bought and sold. In two cases, Essex County Council was able to purchase the manorial rights to the land over Upminster Common and the common land attached to Waveley Lodge. A similar case occurred in Surrey when the county council proposed buying the manorial rights to Epsom Common (428 acres [173 ha]) and “throwing open the common to the public generally.” In effect, the existence of manorial rights premised the existence of open space to exercise those rights, and this effectively prevented residential development.
Figure 2: Plan for Development of Warley, Brentwood

Source: ERO T/2 147/4.

Note: Dark gray area represents the area of the greenbelt to be reserved as part of the development of the site. ERO = Essex Records Office Archives.
In an exceptional case, Richmond Borough Council proposed to have an order issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries to transfer Lammas rights (rights related to the agricultural use of the land) from one piece of land that the local authority was not interested in to one that it planned to buy. As long as these rights to allow the grazing of animals were held, the land could not be developed, and the price was estimated to be reduced by £10,000.69

**Combination with other public works.** The data from Middlesex and Essex show that councils purchased land for the greenbelt but then used it for road widening, hospitals, schools, or other uses related to the provision of public facilities. For example, in Essex a piece of the greenbelt purchases was used to construct the Dartford Tunnel approach road. Seven and a half acres of Pyrgo Park were sold to the public health committee as a hospital site. A large amount of the land that was bought came from estates and mansion houses. This meant that councils, in addition to funding the purchase of greenbelt land, had to find ways of using country houses.

**Neighboring contributions.** Neighboring landowners could be encouraged to contribute to the land’s purchase as it was widely understood that such neighbors stood to gain from having the greenbelt nearby. The contribution could be as high as 16.7 percent of the total purchase price, as in the case of Ockham Common.70

**Gifts of land.** In some cases the landowners made a gift to the local authority so that the land could be included in the greenbelt. This occurred in Essex where 4.8 acres [1.9 ha] of woodland at Laingdon Hills were given to the council for inclusion in the greenbelt.71 Gifting of land was not unknown in Surrey either as the case of Glory Woods, a gift made to the district by the Duke of Newcastle in the late 1920s, shows. The Duke then withdrew his gift in protest of plans to build a bypass around Dorking.72 The Council for the Preservation of Rural England was active in encouraging landowners to give their land for the public benefit.73 Gifting, however, was an exception and reliant on landowners who were particularly interested in town planning and had land to spare.

**Early negotiations with sympathetic landowners.** In the 1930s estates agents in Surrey regularly forwarded information about any piece of land that was for sale to the local authorities.74 Local authorities therefore had an early warning of which land was for sale. They could use this information to quickly enter into negotiations with the relevant landowners and make an offer to purchase land for preservation in the greenbelt. This may have enabled Beddington and Wallington Urban District Council in Surrey, for example, to hear that builders had entered into negotiations.
with a landowner to purchase an estate for £65,000 and erect five hundred small houses on it. The local authority immediately negotiated with the landowner and was able to purchase the land for £57,500. Although this would seem like a large discount, it was not unusual for the time. A landowner such as Sir Jeremiah Coleman, for example, was said by his agent in Surrey to have refused an offer of £500 an acre for his land. This land was eventually offered to the council for £250 an acre.

**Secret bargaining.** If an agreement could not be reached, the council was permitted to employ a compulsory purchase order to force the landowner to sell the land. However, to allow this, a public inquiry had to be held after which the Minister of Health would decide whether the purchase was permitted to go ahead. As much as possible, authorities avoided this situation as it would involve a lengthy procedure, and the publicity generated would raise the price of other potentially suitable areas of land. Instead, they conducted what were known as “secret bargains” with the landowner. Further details of this negotiation method have already been described by Amati and Yokohari.

**Purchasing Crown Land in the Greenbelt**

In the case of Crown land, the Commissioner, C. L. Stocks, did not have the flexibility that private landowners had to offer land at a discount. Stocks was involved in the sale of two pieces of land for open space between 1934 and 1936. The land was described as a belt of land, to the east of London in Essex, measuring 1.6 km in width and 9.7 km in length covering 1,400 ha and connecting Hainault and Epping forests.

The Crown land was flat and ideal for development. Its use was largely agricultural, and it was adjacent to the London North-Eastern Railway line and the projected extension of the new Central underground line. The land was sold by Stocks in two sections. Three hundred and eighty hectares known as Fairlop were sold in early 1935 for an aerodrome. Ninety-three hectares of land known as Hainault Forest were sold for the greenbelt in 1936-37. We examine below how these purchases took place.

**Purchasing Fairlop Plain: The Crown Lands versus the LCC**

The LCC had attempted different methods to rehouse the poor and move them from inner-city slums. The council decided, almost arbitrarily, that providing out-of-town estates with subsidized transport was the most effective method. In 1894-95 it purchased tramways with a view to providing cheap transportation. By the 1930s the council was committed to a policy of cottage or “out-county” estates, which provided a minimum
of small, single-class dwellings, linked to the centers of employment by part-
subsidized transport.

The LCC was being subjected to tremendous pressure by residents who
wanted to move out of crowded tenements in London’s East End to sites
outside London. The LCC required the 380 ha of Fairlop Plain for hous-
ing in late 1934 because it had used all of its available land. They received
approximately 120,000 applications for accommodation a year but had
only been able to construct 50,000 houses during the last fifteen years.81

In late 1934 Frank Hunt, chief valuer at the LCC, wrote to Stocks to
request whether Fairlop could be sold and developed for housing. Hunt was
one of the longest serving officers of the council at the time. He was part
of a crop of officers who had entered the council in the 1890s as a young
man without the benefit of a good education and had risen through the
ranks.82 In February 1935 a meeting was held between the Greater London
Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC) and the LCC. The GLRPC
included Mr. Hardy-Syms, the technical adviser who replaced Raymond
Unwin. The LCC included Frank Hunt and Lewis Silkin, chairman of the
Housing and Public Health Committee, who became Minister of Town and
Country Planning in the postwar Labour government and implemented the
British New Towns policy.83 Silkin stressed the need for more houses and
the pressures that LCC were under. The GLRPC argued that Fairlop Plain
would be essential for use as an aerodrome and that it was necessary to
to entirely surround London with these. Hardy-Sims presented a map of
existing and projected need for aerodromes around London (Figure 3). It
was expected that twenty-six out of a total of thirty-seven sites would be
required in the future; intending to satisfy an assumed growth in private
aircraft ownership that was to rival motorcar ownership at the time. Each
of the large circles around the location of the aerodrome is an indication
of the space to be preserved for landing, takeoff, and buildings related
to the aerodromes. Considering the Greater London Regional Planning
Committee’s support for the greenbelt, it is perhaps no coincidence that all
the circles on the map touch each other and form a belt around London.84
Both came to an agreement that Hunt and Hardy-Syms would meet on a
separate occasion to explore the different possibilities.

It seems strange that the LCC would oppose the purchase of land for
open space when only a few days earlier it had announced its greenbelt
scheme. Herbert Morrison, chairman of the LCC, had grown to dislike the
Greater London Regional Planning Committee and in particular Hardy-
Syms for expressing independent opinions that were not acceptable to
London.85 The LCC was trapped in a dilemma; on the one hand, it was not
prepared to accept the opinions of an independent body for planning
London and wanted to implement its plans for rehousing the poor. On the
other hand, it openly supported open-space preservation through its
recently approved greenbelt loans’ scheme.
In the struggle between the LCC and the Greater London Regional Planning Council and their different uses for Fairlop Plain, C. L. Stocks as the landowner played a key role in preventing the land being sold for housing development. While maintaining an appearance of detached interest toward the threat of LCC’s housing scheme, Stocks clearly supported keeping the land as open as possible. He first wanted to give consideration to a variety of open-space uses such as golf or aviation. When describing his reasons for doing this to a member of Essex County Council, he explained

Figure 3: Projected Aerodromes around London, 1935
Source: TNA PRO CRES 35/665.
Note: This was used as an argument for conserving land. Each of the circles represents an aerodrome with the area of land conserved around it. TNA PRO = The National Archives Public Records Office.
that it was “simply to invent every possible kind of public user which will preserve the property as a public open space of some kind in the future, while securing the revenue which we must, as trustees, secure.”\textsuperscript{87} He chose to solicit opinions from the Air Ministry on the suitability of land for building an aerodrome. Stocks also asked Ilford Borough Council to make an offer for the land, and the local council discussions were reported in the local press.\textsuperscript{88}

Fairlop Plain was situated in Ilford Borough Council, which supported the claims for an aerodrome. To purchase the land for this purpose, they required a loan from the Ministry of Health of £250,000. The matter was referred to a Ministry of Health Public Enquiry [sic]. During the enquiry, the borough council called on the evidence of the Greater London Regional Planning Committee and the famous airman Sir Alan Cobham to argue their case.\textsuperscript{89} Finally, the Ministry of Health granted a loan for Ilford Borough Council to buy the land for an aerodrome in late 1935.

The case of Fairlop Plain shows that C. L. Stocks delayed selling the land until an open-space use for it had been found. He thus allowed the arguments in support of providing aerodromes to conserve open space to take precedence over the LCC’s urgent housing needs despite the presence of important figures such as Lewis Silkin and Frank Hunt putting the case forward for housing. Stocks’s actions are notable not only because he was prepared to “invent” different functions for the open space that he should have sold for development but also because he was a civil servant working in a branch of the government that had nothing to do with planning. Stocks’s actions concur with Hall, Gracey, and Drewett’s comment that at the time, an almost “mystical belief” in the importance of preserving land at any cost existed.\textsuperscript{90}

\textit{Purchasing Hainault: The Crown Lands versus Private Developers}

Although the preservation of Fairlop Plain as an aerodrome, which was “mostly green grass and therefore far preferable to houses,”\textsuperscript{91} had been dealt with to the satisfaction of Stocks, the adjacent site, Hainault, soon came under pressure for urbanization in early 1936. The action of Stocks and the role of the press and public opinion were instrumental in saving this land for open space. The existence of the LCC greenbelt scheme provided additional support in the arguments to preserve the land.

First, news that the land would be sold to developers reached the newspapers. A number of articles appeared that highlighted the paradox that the Crown agents were making a profit at the expense of local amenities. Second, Stocks was also pressured by a letter in \textit{The Times} signed by F. J. Osborn, among others, about the danger of losing a greenbelt town and a letter in \textit{Country Life} (“Ugliness Pays”).\textsuperscript{92} Stocks responded by taking pains to answer these letters and to restore relations with amenity groups. For
example, in response to an inquiry from the secretary of the Metropolitan Gardens Association who had read the correspondence in The Times, he wearily noted, “I saw her and explained that we are virtuous people. She was pleased.”93 In aiming to preserve the openness of the land but to return a profit from it, Stocks was willing to consider other uses for Hainault, such as golf or aviation. He explained that “only green-belting could preserve the area for aviation in the future and that we must have immediate revenue.”94 When the LCC only proposed to offer a loan of 30 percent for purchasing the land, Essex was unwilling to contribute the rest because of the expense,95 the local newspaper reported that as “far as Essex County Council is concerned, it would seem the preservation scheme is as good as dead.”96 Stocks, however, was willing to delay selling the land until Essex County Council had decided to buy. In the meantime, developers and the Crown agents’ real estate agents pressured Stocks to sell the land to the highest bidder.97 These demands were all rebuffed.

Following a conference of the county and local authorities and with Essex County Council’s agreement, 320 acres (130 ha) of the land were purchased for £145,000 for inclusion in the greenbelt.98 It is unlikely that such a purchase could have been made had Stocks not been willing to wait for the greenbelt negotiations to be finalized.

Discussion

The Motivation for Selling Land to the Greenbelt Scheme

The objective of this study was to problematize the processes in the establishment of the greenbelt to counter the prevailing assumption that the greenbelt was the inevitable result of the ideas of a few planning heroes. The results show that the greenbelt was contingent on the actions of civil servants such as C. L. Stocks, county and district council members, and landowners. The results suggest that the belief in the importance of preserving land and therefore the greenbelt cut across all political lines and went from central government down to local district level. Furthermore, the conflict between Stocks and the LCC shows that preserving land took precedence over other pressing concerns such as rehousing London’s poor.

The effort that civil servants such as Stocks and council members made to preserve land is not surprising because they were acting in terms of how they defined the public’s interest. In addition, Stocks was a member of the Council for the Preservation of Rural England and had sympathy for the cause of preserving open spaces. What is more mysterious is the motivation of private landowners for gifting the land or offering it to councils on favorable terms. The following discussion looks more closely at the motivations that private landowners had for allowing the greenbelt to be established.
Although the private landowners appear to have been acting altruistically, they were able to benefit from these arrangements by writing conditions into the sale of their land or by exerting influence over the authority making the purchase. Sir Jeremiah Coleman’s generous offer to the local authority, referred to above, was related to his demands to convince the council to increase the permitted number of houses on an adjoining site for development from fifty-eight to sixty-six houses, and to ask the local authority to plant trees for screening the site. Furthermore, the neighboring contributions of landowners to the greenbelt scheme shows that there was widespread understanding of the benefits that would accrue to a landowner if land was preserved nearby.

More generally, landowners were able to influence the way in which public open space was used; relinquishing ownership was acceptable to them, but not relinquishing control over the landscape. For example, many agreements made between landowners and the local authorities stipulated that buildings should not be erected on the site or that trees should not be cut down except in the course of normal estate management. Other agreements insisted that the land should be kept as public open space. Landowners in some cases felt that they were better custodians of the public open space than the local authority. In one notable case, the Duchess of Northumberland refused to sell the land to Surrey County Council for the greenbelt because she felt that she could preserve the land for the public more effectively than the planners. Members of Surrey County Council clearly shared some of these landowners’ views.

Landowners were motivated by altruism and a paternalistic attitude toward the land. The idealization of the countryside and the view that the preservation of such a large area of open space was in the public interest were linked to the idealization of the countryside by the nineteenth-century romantic movement. However, it is possible that an attitude of noblesse oblige motivated the giving away of land. The landowners who were able to sell land in Surrey, Middlesex, and Essex included King George VI through the Duchy of Lancaster’s estate and well-known figures such as Lord Crewe, the former Secretary of State for the Colonies (1910-1915). It also included landed gentry such as Lady Cheylesmore and Lady Lovelace and large establishments such as Trinity College Cambridge and Merton College Oxford. The greenbelt had become a royal concern, and a famous contribution to the greenbelt had been Windsor Great Park. King George VI took a personal interest in the greenbelt and wondered whether provisions for Scout Camps could not be made within it.

The noblesse oblige and public-spiritedness of landowners in establishing the greenbelt appear to be nothing more than a historical curiosity, notable as an example of a bygone era in which the magnanimity and selflessness of a handful of individuals could produce a planning policy that was to last for more than fifty years. We would argue on the other hand that
the results are relevant because they enable us to think differently about the role of public-spiritedness in the present-day planning of London’s greenbelt. Flexibility to allow some sustainable housing as part of a greenbelt reform is one of the most pressing needs with planning the London greenbelt today, as the United Kingdom’s two foremost planning organizations, the Royal Town Planning Institute and the Town and Country Planning Association, argue. These organizations ally themselves with economists such as McCann and other commentators who point out that the vociferous support for the greenbelt derives from the beneficial effect it has on nearby property values but comes at the expense of higher house prices in the city overall. The so-called NIMBY-ism (not in my backyard) of greenbelt supporters who benefit from the policy prevents the government from taking any measures to increase the housing stock.

Initially, we could be led by the results to conclude that public-spiritedness in the 1930s meant the gifting or discount selling of land to establish the greenbelt. In effect, the landowners in the 1930s were contributing to the councils’ cost of land purchase and were being public-spirited because they were prepared to give some of their own funds to support the nascent greenbelt. It is important to realize that any preservation of land entails an opportunity cost in nondevelopment.

The public-spiritedness of landowners can therefore be looked at differently by knowing this. By gifting or selling land cheaply, landowners were acting in a public-spirited way by paying for some of the opportunity costs of nondevelopment. After 1947 all of the landowners in the greenbelt lost their right to develop and were compensated, albeit inadequately, by central government. However, the planning system failed to find a mechanism to pay for the opportunity costs of nondevelopment. This failure has meant that landowners who live in or near the greenbelt have benefited from its implementation without paying for the opportunity costs of nondevelopment and is one of the reasons why NIMBY-ism remains a powerful obstacle to greenbelt reform. The search for an adequate greenbelt reform must therefore begin by rediscovering flexibility in the implementation of the greenbelt and by finding a way to invoke the public-spiritedness of landowners to compensate society for the opportunity costs of nondevelopment.

Conclusions

Up until now, the historians of the greenbelt have emphasized the role of planning heroes such as Ebenezer Howard and Raymond Unwin. The history of the greenbelt has been written as a cumulative series of interventions as each planning hero played his part to rationally produce a greenbelt that attempted to meet public demand. This has made invisible
the problematic and complex processes involved in determining the aim of, and purchasing land for, the establishment of the greenbelt.

The results of our study lead us to conclude that there needs to be a considerable readjustment in the way that planning historians approach the topic of the London greenbelt. Centrally, the link between the laudable aims of the greenbelt and its practical implementation has to be reassessed. The results show that while the conceptual aim of the greenbelt was based on publicly motivated concerns such as accessing space for leisure, its practical aim was flexible. While at the local level substantial variation existed in the justifications for implementing a greenbelt, the overriding justification was simply to ensure the implementation of the policy by purchasing as much land as possible. This overriding justification is summed up by C. L. Stocks the commissioner for Crown lands’ attitude toward land preservation; he was prepared to “invent” every possible open-space use for the land to ensure that it would not be developed. The process of (re)inventing aims for the greenbelt continues today and is one of the reasons why it has survived so many changes of government in the United Kingdom.

The results also demonstrate that the role of planning heroes should be reassessed. Members of councils and landowners had important roles to play in allowing the greenbelt to be established. The results show how these apparently antagonistic agents were able to work together to ensure that land was bought. The establishment of the greenbelt, rather than illustrating the rationally determined outcome of well-thought-out planning theories, demonstrates the resourceful actions of planners as they use what is at their disposal, be it connections to elite networks, access to information, or knowledge of how to use obscure rights associated with land. The results suggest that a particular class of well-connected individuals supported the greenbelt and its aims, causing us to question their motivations. For example, to what extent can the involvement of the aristocratic landowners be seen as a strategy to (re)gain political power? Further work is necessary to answer this question and others that relate to the role of landowners.

The particular rights’ regime and the flexible planning system in the United Kingdom point to two fundamental reasons for why the greenbelt successfully prevented London’s urban growth but failed to in other countries. Such considerations may be useful for policy makers in the United States who are engaged in framing the purchase of development rights’ schemes. Whereas invoking a spirit of noblesse oblige might be too much to ask of landowners, understanding the importance of flexibility and the ability to sell and exchange certain rights associated with the land may well be.

In his book Planning by Consent Philip Booth has noted that flexibility was a characteristic of 1930s’ planning and that landownership rights had been subjected to a process of splitting and unbundling over the course of the previous two hundred years. We conclude that the combination of flexibility in setting the aim of the greenbelt and the contingency of a set
of landownership rights should place the establishment of the greenbelt within a different historiography from that of planning heroes and their ideas. Instead, the establishment of the greenbelt sits more logically within a historiography of public administration and the evolution of development control.

Notes


16. Thomas, London’s Green Belt, 47.


18. Miller, Raymond Unwin, 190–94.

19. On which 138 local authorities around London were represented, controlling an area of 2,952 km². See D. Thomas, London’s Green Belt, 52.

20. Miller, Raymond Unwin, 205.


22. These were the counties of Essex, Middlesex, Kent, Surrey, Hertfordshire, Buckinghamshire, and London.


24. References as follows. TNA PRO: The National Archives Public Records Office, London; SHC: Surrey History Centre, Woking, Surrey; GBSC: Green-Belt Sub-Committee; SCC: Surrey County Council Minutes; CPRE: Council for the Preservation of Rural England Archives, University of Reading; LMA: London Metropolitan Archives; ERO: Essex Records Office Archives. LMA LCC/CL/PK1/26
Question put by Mr. Batley to the council meeting July 28, 1938. Miller, Raymond Unwin, 208, puts the figure at 11,400 ha in less than two years. In reality arriving at an exact figure was difficult because of the number of loose arrangements that councils entered into with landowners.

25. TNA PRO ED 31/586.
31. The greenbelt in Korea is known as the “Restricted Development Zone.” Currently a number of attempts are being made to allow a controlled expansion of Seoul’s developed area. See Town and Country Planning Association (TCPA), Commentary on RDZ Policy Reform in Korea (London: TCPA, 1999), 17.
34. King, The Bungalow, 156–92.
36. PRO HLG 4/3353 Report by Adams and Thompson for Mid-Surrey Joint Town Planning Committee (JTPC), October 14, 1926.
38. PRO HLG 52/1217 Annex to the Greater London Region Reservation of Open spaces, deputation to the minister, January 30, 1934.
39. PRO HLG 4/3764 Letter from minister to participants of Thames valley regional conference, June 12, 1922.
40. TNA PRO HLG 79/1074 LCC Joint report of the Parks Committee and the Town Planning Committee, December 14, 1934.
42. TNA PRO HLG 79/1074 Conversation between Sir P. Henriques and W. A. Ross, December 10, 1935; Ibid. Letter from Culpin to Pepler, December 13, 1935.
43. LMA LCC/CL/PK/1/25 Letter from the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC) to London County Council (LCC) on the criteria for purchasing land in the greenbelt, January 16, 1936.
44. Ibid. Letter from Gater, January 18, 1939.
45. Ibid. TNA PRO HLG 79/1074.
46. SHC GBSC, Minutes, Appendix No. 2, Dudley Auckland, May 9, 1935.
47. SHC GBSC, Minutes, Appendix No. 1, G. C. Sanderson, April 25, 1935.
48. As in the case of Morden, see SHC GBSC Minutes, August 7, 1935.
49. Ibid. Minutes, August 8, 1935.
50. LMA LCC/CL/PK/1/25 Letter from the Greater London Regional Planning Committee (GLRPC) to London County Council (LCC) on the criteria for purchasing land in the greenbelt, January 16, 1936.
owned several pieces of land on the outskirts of London. TNA PRO CRES 36/89 Minute regarding the Green Belt and Home Counties Bill, January 18, 1938.

54. TNA PRO CRES 35/668 Minute from Stocks to minister, July 7, 1937.
55. TNA PRO CRES 35/668 Letter from C. L. Stocks to R. Adams, county of Essex, April 8, 1936.
56. Ibid. Minute from Stocks, March 7, 1937.
57. TNA PRO HLG 52/1217 Greater London Region—Reservation of Open Spaces, deputation to the minister, reply January 30, 1934.
60. Chuter-Ede was a member of the Labour Party and became the Home Secretary after the 1945 Labour election victory. In 1951 he became leader of the Commons.
61. ERO C/DP 10/110 notebook on the ownership and area of purchased greenbelt land.
62. SHC GBSC, Minutes, Appendix No. 6, May 9, 1935.
63. Ibid. Appendix 1, Ham House and Adjoining Land, July 11, 1935; and minutes, June 18, 1936.
64. LMA MCC/C/E+H/1386.
65. ERO T/2 147/7.
66. ERO C/DP 10/110 notebook on the ownership and area of purchased greenbelt land.
68. SCC GBSC Minutes, August 13, 1935.
69. SHC GBSC, Minutes, Appendix No. 6, Minutes, June 18, 1936.
70. See SHC GBSC, Minutes, August 11, 1935. Also Amati and Yokohari, “Temporal Changes.”
71. ERO C/DP 10/110 notebook on the ownership and area of purchased greenbelt land.
72. TNA PRO HLG/4/3353 Times article, July 31, 1929.
73. CPRE Minutes, Abererombie, July 21, 1927.
74. SHC GBSC, Minutes, November 20, 1935. Also TNA PRO HLG 79/1074 Conversation between Sir P. Henriques and W. A. Ross, December 10, 1935; and letter from Culpin to Pepler, December 13, 1935.
75. SHC GBSC, Minutes, August 2, 1935.
76. Ibid., Minutes, December 10, 1936.
77. TNA PRO HLG 54/175 Surrey County Council Act, Sect. 70-71, 1931.
78. Amati and Yokohari, “Temporal Changes.”
80. Saint, *Politics and the People of London*.
81. TNA PRO CRES 35/665 Mr. F. Hunt examined by Mr. Robertson, Public Inquiry shorthand notes, August 1, 1935.
82. Clifton, “Members and Officers of the LCC.”
83. See note 81.
84. Ibid. Note from Hardy Sims, GLRPC on Aviation in the future, February 1, 1935.
86. TNA PRO CRES 35/665 Internal Memorandum, C. L. Stocks, January 15, 1935.
87. Ibid. Letter from Stocks to R. Adams, February 1, 1935.
89. Ibid. *Ilford Recorder*, August 1, 1935.
91. TNA PRO CRES 35/668 Minute from Stocks to the minister, June 24, 1937. Also see letter from Stocks to County Surveyor, January 9, 1936.
93. TNA PRO CRES 35/668 Letter from E. Drew to C. L. Stocks, August 6, 1937.
94. Ibid. Reply from Blanford to C. L. Stocks about viability of obtaining golf profits at Hainault, January 1, 1935. Ibid. Letter from Holveroff to Stocks about interview, February 5, 1935.
95. Ibid. Reply from Blanford to C. L. Stocks about viability of obtaining golf profits at Hainault, January 1, 1935. Ibid. Letter from Holveroff to Stocks about interview, February 5, 1935.
96. Ibid. Romford Recorder, Editorial, April 10, 1936.
97. TNA PRO CRES 35/668 Letter from Cluttons to Stocks, June 27, 1937.
98. Ibid. Romford Recorder, extract from report, June 17, 1938.
99. SHC GBSC, Minutes, October 12, 1936. Also see SHC SCC, Minutes, November 24, 1936 for a similar case.
100. SHC GBSC, Minutes, conditions laid down by Stanley Garton, March 1, 1935.
101. SHC SCC, Minutes, July 26, 1938, p. 1598.
102. For example, Surrey County Council’s purchase of manorial rights over land and throwing it “open to the public.” SHC GBSC, Minutes, August 13, 1935.
105. LMA LCC/CL/PK/1/26 Letter from Buckingham Palace to Gater February 5, 1937.

Marco Amati, PhD, is a specialist in the study of the London greenbelt. He has accumulated wide-ranging experience in planning and land use issues through involvement with projects for the European Union in Luxembourg and through study in Japan. From 2000 to 2005 he obtained a scholarship to live in Japan and study for a PhD. His research looked at the implementation and reform of the London greenbelt comparing this with the early postwar greenbelt around Tokyo. Since 2005 he has been a lecturer in the Resource and Environmental Planning program at Massey University, New Zealand, where he continues to publish on issues related to greenbelt and urban growth restraint.

Makoto Yokohari is a specialist in Japanese and international landscape planning. He is currently a professor at the University of Tokyo, Japan. For more than fifteen years his aim has been to question the application of Western urban planning techniques in Japan and to develop new indigenous planning concepts for the Japanese landscape. He is active in a number of national-level projects and is a member of the editorial board for international journals that include Landscape and Urban Planning, Landscape Research, and Landscape and Ecosystem Engineering. He has coedited two books and was part of a group that represented Japan during Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development trade negotiations in the late 1990s.